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Abstract: For a great majority of former colonies, the outcome of decolonization was 
independence. Yet scattered across the globe, remnants of former colonial empires are still 
non-sovereign as part of larger metropolitan states. There is little drive for independence in 
these territories, virtually all of which are small island nations, also known as sub-national 
island jurisdictions (SNIJs). Why do so many former colonial territories choose to remain 
non-sovereign? In this paper we attempt to answer this question by conducting a global 
comparative study of non-sovereign jurisdictions. We start off by analyzing their present 
economic, social and political conditions, after which we assess local levels of (dis)content 
with the contemporary political status, and their articulation in postcolonial politics. We 
find that levels of discontent and frustration covary with the particular demographic, socio-
economic and historical-cultural conditions of individual territories. While significant 
independence movements can be observed in only two or three jurisdictions, in virtually all 
cases there is profound dissatisfaction and frustration with the contemporary non-sovereign 
arrangement and its outcomes. Instead of achieving independence, the territories’ real 
struggle nowadays is for obtaining ‘true equality’ with the metropolis, as well as recognition 
of their distinct cultural identities. 
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Introduction 
 
In his book Surpassing the Sovereign State (2014), David Rezvani argues that a non-sovereign 
(or partially independent) status represents the best political arrangement for small island 
territories. On the basis of a global comparative analysis, Rezvani (2014, p. vii) demonstrates 
that partially independent territories (‘PITs’) “tend to be wealthier and more secure than their 
sovereign state counterparts.” Similar arguments have been made by other scholars who seek 
explanations for the fact that many small island jurisdictions – the great majority of which are 
former colonies – opt to remain politically linked to a larger metropolitan power (Aldrich & 
Connell, 1998; Baldacchino, 2010; Chauvin, Clegg & Cousin, 2018; Clegg & Killingray, 
2012; Clegg & Pantojas-García, 2009; Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003). 
While the ‘classic’ notion of decolonization envisages the attainment of independence 
as the culmination of this process, the last small island nation to obtain independence and 
United Nations membership was Palau in 1994. Around 60 sub-national island jurisdictions 
(SNIJs) and other non-sovereign jurisdictions can presently be found around the globe, with 
the exact number varying depending on the specific criteria chosen. Thus Rezvani (2014, p. 
12) lists 66, the CIA World Factbook (2018) lists 58, and we argue below for a total of 55. 
The fact that none of these jurisdictions have become independent in the last quarter of a 
century is a clear indication that these territories prefer a non-sovereign arrangement over the 
attainment of full independence, and that the various metropolitan states agree to, or at least 
accept, this choice.  
 But Rezvani notwithstanding, in territories around the world, non-sovereignty 
continues to create ambiguities, debates, and controversies. Lack of full autonomy, 
metropolitan domination and control, contentious colonial history, and cultural tensions 
create a situation in which citizens of these territories perceive non-sovereignty as a rationally 
pragmatic, but ideologically, culturally, and possibly even psychologically deeply 
unsatisfactory political outcome (Baldacchino & Hepburn, 2012; Corbin, 2012; Grydehøj, 
2016a; Veenendaal, 2016). 
While this article focuses on the perspectives of the non-sovereign jurisdictions, a word 
about metropolitan policies and perspectives is appropriate. Some 70 years ago, the United 
Nations (1960), in its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, stated that “All people have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” While this Resolution 1541 had sovereignty as a first option, ‘free 
association’ was explicitly defined as another legitimate outcome. A free choice for 
incorporation, integration, or some sort of association with the former metropolis has since 
also been considered an acceptable outcome of the process of decolonization (United Nations, 
1960; Igarashi, 2002). This implies that, at present, no metropolitan state is in a position to 
unilaterally end the postcolonial relationship. Various metropolitan states may and indeed do 
differ, however, in the enthusiasm with which they embrace the resultant responsibilities and 
costs. This in turn affects the quality of the relationship and the way it is perceived in the 
non-sovereign jurisdictions. 
We suggest that the ways in which non-sovereignty is evaluated by the overseas 
territories themselves is contingent upon five factors: geography, history, demography, 
economy (including the domain of ecology), and politics/constitution. Non-sovereignty is 
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undoubtedly appreciated differently in a culturally homogenous, politically stable, and 
economically prosperous territory like St. Pierre and Miquelon than in a heterogeneous, poor, 
and politically contested jurisdiction like New Caledonia. Several studies have explored the 
factors that may result in different appraisals of non-sovereign arrangements and, hence, in 
some cases in pro-independence activism (e.g. Baldacchino & Hepburn, 2012; Clegg, 2012a; 
Adler-Nissen & Gad, 2013). Building on these studies and our own previously published work, 
we present a comparative analysis of non-sovereign territories worldwide, in order to examine 
how non-sovereignty is evaluated from the perspective of the non-sovereign jurisdictions. 
We start off by providing a concise overview of all non-sovereign territories worldwide, 
in the process arguing for a narrowing down of our total sample of 55 to 40, excluding both 
jurisdictions that do not have a colonial history (and hence no tradition of anticolonial 
sentiments) and territories that today most likely have no chance to move towards 
independence should they want so. Subsequently, we examine the conditions of the 
remaining non-sovereign jurisdictions following the five basic factors mentioned. We will 
then look at the appreciation of the non-sovereign status from the overseas territories’ 
perspectives. In the conclusion, we summarize our findings and outline some potential future 
prospects and trends. 
A caveat about our approach is appropriate here. Adam Grydehøj (2018) recently 
reminded us of the importance for island studies scholars to reflect upon their positionality. 
The authors of this article come from different backgrounds and scholarly traditions, contrasts 
which certainly resonated in the process of researching and writing this paper. We are not 
certain whether we should indeed see a binary opposition between metropolitan and 
Indigenous voices, as Grydehøj (2018, p. 10) seems to suggest. We do agree though, as will 
become clear, that it makes little sense to think of non-sovereignty exclusively in constitutional 
and political terms, leaving out emic perspectives. This is one reason why a discussion of the 
pursuit of 'true equality’ runs through this entire article. We define this equality both in a 
material sense (standard of living, access to high-quality public services such as health and 
education) and in the domain of identity (being accepted as part of the metropolitan state and 
culture, while retaining the right to retain and celebrate local identities). 
 
Status quo: basic factors 
 
Geography 
Non-sovereign jurisdictions can be found around the world, but the majority are clustered in 
specific world regions that correspond to the world’s oceans and seas. Containing 18 non-
sovereign jurisdictions, the Caribbean is the region that houses the largest number of such 
territories. Second is the Atlantic Ocean with 13 territories, followed by the Pacific with 11. 
Six non-sovereign jurisdictions can be found in the Indian Ocean, four in the Mediterranean, 
two on the Chinese coast, one in the Korea Strait (Jeju), one in the Arctic (Svalbard) and one 
in the Baltic Sea (Åland). These jurisdictions have political relationships with a total of 12 
metropolitan powers, being the United Kingdom (15 non-sovereign territories), France (12), 
the Netherlands (6), the United States (5), Australia (3), New Zealand (3), Spain (3), China 
(2), Denmark (2), Portugal (2), South Korea (1), and Finland (1) and Norway (1). While some 
metropolitan states, such as Australia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
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have links with territories in multiple world regions, others maintain relations with territories 
in only one region. 
 The great majority of non-sovereign jurisdictions are located in non-moderate climate 
zones, mainly in tropical parts of the globe, but some others like Greenland, Svalbard and the 
Falkland Islands in extremely cold environments. Only a handful, such as Gibraltar and Jersey, 
are in (relatively) moderate zones, in or near to Europe. European migration history is the 
key here. In previous centuries, Europeans preferred to settle in large numbers in moderate 
climate zones, establishing what Alfred Crosby (2004, p. 2) called ‘Neo-Europes’. 
In terms of geographical characteristics, the great majority of non-sovereign 
jurisdictions are island units with a small population and a limited territorial size. Greenland, 
the Falkland Islands, French Guiana, New Caledonia, Svalbard, and the French Southern and 
Antarctic Lands (TAAF) are the only non-sovereign jurisdictions with land areas of over 
10,000 km². Many of these latter territories are, however, very sparsely populated and have 
very low population densities. The remaining non-insular, non-sovereign jurisdictions are 
very small enclaves that are all located in the Mediterranean: Akrotiri and Dhekelia (on the 
island of Cyprus), Ceuta and Melilla (enclosed by Morocco), and Gibraltar (bordered by 
Spain) are on this list. French Guiana, a substantial territory on the South American continent, 
might be designated as insular in a metaphorical sense, as its inhabitants mainly live on the 
coastal strip facing the Atlantic coast, with a dense rainforest separating them from the rest of 
the South American continent. 
While as indicated almost all non-sovereign jurisdictions are island units, differences 
exist with regard to the number of islands united within these jurisdictions. Some cases consist 
of only a single island (e.g. Anguilla, Aruba, Guam, Jersey, Mayotte, Niue), while others 
comprise a small number (e.g. Cayman Islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Tokelau, Wallis and 
Futuna) or a larger number of islands (e.g. Åland, British Virgin Islands, Faroe Islands, 
Northern Mariana Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands). These geographical features have a 
considerable impact on these jurisdictions’ opportunities and challenges, their actual 
functioning and hence the appraisal of non-sovereignty by the various parties involved, with 
multi-island jurisdictions facing recurrent challenges of inter-insular rivalries that may be more 
salient than contestations with the metropolitan state. 
To summarize, with a few exceptions the world’s non-sovereign jurisdictions are small 
and insular. While there may be no direct statistical correlation between either smallness or 
insularity and economic sustainability (Armstrong & Read, 2000; Easterly & Kraay, 2000), 
we argue that in all of the jurisdictions discussed in this article, an awareness of the 
vulnerabilities that come with their small size has kept them from seeking full sovereignty. 
This applies even to those territories that have quite sizable territories, such as French Guiana, 
Greenland, and Puerto Rico.  
 
History 
Without colonialism, most of the 55 non-sovereign territories scattered across the globe 
would have had an altogether different history and contemporary status. Expressions such as 
“Confetti of Empire” (Guillebaud, 1976) or “Last Colonies” (Aldrich & Connell, 1998) are 
not particularly considerate, but they do make the logical connection to colonization and 
especially to this last, never-ending phase of decolonization. Perhaps counterintuitively, in 
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these places colonialism was not followed by full decolonization and the complete severing 
of colonial ties, but rather by some sort of postcolonial relationship.  
 The picture is slightly more complicated though. A minority of these territories have 
never been formal colonies, but were rather acquired in European or Mediterranean wars 
waged centuries ago: the Channel Islands (13th Century), Ceuta (1668) and Gibraltar (1713) 
are cases in point. Other non-sovereign territories such as the Azores, the Canary Islands and 
Madeira were colonized in the earliest phase of European colonization, but as the native 
populations were annihilated and the islands were repopulated by metropolitans, they came 
to be perceived both by locals and metropolitans as integral – even if faraway and hence 
inevitably peripheral – parts of the metropolitan state. And what of uninhabited islands once 
discovered and sparsely settled by Europeans, such as Saint-Paul and Amsterdam, Crozet and 
Kerguelen, part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF) in the Indian Ocean? 
While their origins hark back to the broader history of European colonialism, they have no 
colonial past in the sense that most non-sovereign territories have: colonization, subjugation 
and/or annihilation of the native population, repopulation and development mainly by means 
of enslaved African and/or indentured Asian labor. Seeing that such territories do not really 
fit the ‘classical’ model of linkages between metropolitan states and non-sovereign jurisdictions 
that we examine in this paper, we omit all of these from the rest of our analysis. 
This narrows our analysis to those non-sovereign territories where colonial history still 
matters much in the contemporary reality because of the legacies left behind. Local 
populations literally reflect this history. This is most dramatically the case in the non-sovereign 
Caribbean, where large majorities of local populations descend from enslaved Africans once 
brought to these places by European slavers. Here, colonialism simply meant slavery, 
exploitation, and racism. Only the American colonial presence in the Caribbean, specifically 
in the territories of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands postdates the era of slavery: the 
former was wrangled from the Spanish around 1900, while the latter were literally bought 
from Denmark in 1917. 
 Colonialism left a complex and often painful legacy. African slavery was decisive to 
the development of the Caribbean colonies, but also in non-sovereign territories in the Indian 
Ocean such as La Réunion or Mayotte that, similarly, faced (re)population schemes involving 
ethnic differentiation and discrimination. In these territories however, immigrants came from 
a variety of places. In contrast, in most of the Pacific and particularly Polynesia, colonialism 
dates from a much later period, mostly did not involve mass immigration or the annihilation 
of the native population, and in this sense left a lesser mark on society, culture, and narratives 
of local identity (Firth, 1997). Even so, territories such as the Cook Islands, Guam, and French 
Polynesia do qualify as formerly colonial, and they are still included in the United Nations’ 
list of ‘non-self-governing territories’. If one day they decided to move towards full 
independence, they would probably find a willing ear – if not directly with an enthusiastic 
metropolis, then surely with the United Nations. For this reason, all of these territories remain 
within our sample. 
But what are we to make of Hong Kong (formerly a British colony) and Macau 
(formerly a Portuguese colony), now both Special Administrative Regions of China? Formally, 
they share a typical colonial history with the great majority of non-sovereign territories. What 
sets them apart is the political reality that China, their new metropolis, has made it clear that 
their future lies within the People’s Republic, not in an indefinite prolongation of their 
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present special status (Wong & Xiao, 2018). Something similar goes for Jeju, a self-governing 
province of South Korea. While Jeju has a post-World War Two history of brutal South 
Korean repression, there is no external colonial legacy, nor a serious debate about sovereignty 
(Ryang, 2013; Rogers & Wenger, 2017). Arguably, Hong Kong, Macau and Jeju are the only 
former colonies in the entire group that will not be allowed a free choice about their future 
constitutional status. For this reason, we omit these three from the rest of our analysis as well. 
 This excursion into the realm of history has therefore resulted in a narrowing down 
of our original selection, leaving us with those non-sovereign territories that qualify as former 
colonies and whose present post-colonial status implies the possibility of opting out. This 
means that we have narrowed down our original 55 territories to a group of 40 (see Table 1 
& Figure 1). Among this group, an important distinction can be made between former settler 
colonies and former exploitation colonies. In the first group, which includes the Falkland 
Islands, the Faroe Islands, and St. Pierre and Miquelon, the contemporary population is 
racially and culturally similar to the population of the metropolis. The relative absence of 
slavery, exploitation, and racism entails that the colonial legacy of these territories is much 
less traumatic than that of former exploitation colonies, resulting in a more positive attitude 
towards the continuation of a non-sovereign relationship with the former colonial power. 
 
Table 1: Non-sovereign territories included in this analysis. 
N° Name Population Size  (km²) Region 
Per capita/ 
income (US$) Source/year 
United States of America (3.8 million) 
1 Puerto Rico 3,474,200 9,104 CAR 28636 UN/2016 
2 US Virgin Islands 103,600 346 CAR 36100 CIA/2013 
3 American Samoa 54,300 199 PAC 13000 CIA/2013 
4 Guam 161,800 544 PAC 30500 CIA/2013 
5 Northern Mariana Islands 52,300 464 PAC 13300 CIA/2013 
France (2.7 million) 
6 French Guiana 250,000 83,534 CAR 19024 INSEE/2015 
7 Martinique 386,500 1,128 CAR 28680 INSEE/2015 
8 Guadeloupe 404,000 1,705 CAR 25441 INSEE/2015 
9 Saint-Martin 36,300 53 CAR 17640 INSEE/2010 
10 Saint-Barthélémy 9,000 25 CAR 42840 CEROM/2010 
11 Saint-Pierre et Miquelon 6,100 242 ATL 33960 IEDOM/2008 
12 Mayotte 212,600 374 IND 10321 INSEE/2015 
13 La Réunion 845,000 2,511 IND 25308 INSEE/2015 
14 Wallis-et-Futuna 15,500 142 PAC 12120 IEOM/2005 
15 French Polynesia 268,300 4,167 PAC 19335 UN/2016 
16 New Caledonia 268,800 18,576 PAC 35196 IEOM/206 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (313,200) 
17 Aruba 103,400 179 CAR 25444 UN/2016 
18 Bonaire 17,400 294 CAR 21500 CBS/2015 
19 St. Eustatius 4,000 21 CAR 26600 CBS/2015 
20 St. Maarten 33,600 34 CAR 27116 UN/2016 
21 Saba 2,000 13 CAR 24900 CBS/2015 
22 Curaçao 152,800 444 CAR 15000 CIA/2004 
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United Kingdom (230,156) 
23 Anguilla 13,600 91 CAR 22861 UN/2016 
24 British Virgin Islands 28,100 153 CAR 31677 UN/2016 
25 Cayman Islands 56,700 264 CAR 63261 UN/2016 
26 Turks and Caicos Islands 49,000 616 CAR 26291 UN/2016 
27 Montserrat 4,900 102 CAR 12044 UN/2016 
28 Pitcairn Islands 56 47 PAC -   
29 Bermuda 64,200 53 ATL 99363 UN/2016 
30 Falkland Islands 2,900 12,200 ATL 96200 CIA/2012 
31 St. Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha 7,700 394 ATL 7800 CIA/2009 
Denmark (105,600) 
32 Faroe Islands 49,800 1,399 ATL 40000 CIA/2014 
33 Greenland 55,800 2,166,086 ATL 37600 CIA/2015 
Finland (29,000) 
34 Åland Islands 29,000 1,580 EUR 55000 CIA/2015  
New Zealand (17,600) 
35 Cook Islands 15,000 240 PAC 12300 CIA/2010 
36 Niue 1,200 260 PAC 5800 CIA/2005 
37 Tokelau 1,400 10 PAC 1000 CIA/1993 
Australia (4,900) 
38 Norfolk Island 2,200 35 PAC -   
39 Christmas Island 2,100 135 IND -   
40 Cocos (Keeling) Islands 600 14 IND -   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of non-sovereign territories included in this analysis. 
 
 
 
Malcom Ferdinand, Gert Oostindie, & Wouter Veenendaal 
 
Demography 
While most of the non-sovereign territories can be classified as small island jurisdictions, their 
population numbers vary considerably, ranging from a few dozen (Pitcairn) to almost 3.5 
million (Puerto Rico). Indeed, most citizens of the remaining sample of non-sovereign 
territories are American. In order of demographic magnitude, the French territories (over 2.7 
million inhabitants) are second, followed by the Dutch (310,000), British (just below 
250,000), Danish (100,000), and Finnish (30,000) territories. The populations of the 
Australian and New Zealand territories are much smaller (Table 1). 
As the only jurisdictions with more than half a million citizens, Puerto Rico and La Réunion 
are the only non-sovereign territories that would not qualify as microstates according to most 
scholarly and political categorizations (Veenendaal, 2014). This leads us to a conclusion similar 
to the one on geographical size: an awareness of the vulnerabilities that come with their small 
population size has prevented these jurisdictions from seeking full sovereignty. 
  
Ecology and economy  
The contribution of the non-sovereign territories to global biodiversity is considerable, and 
some of the larger territories such as French Guiana and Greenland are endowed with rich 
natural resources. Most territories are however relatively small, many are quite densely 
populated, and most are highly dependent on external support. In addition, particularly the 
islands located in tropical zones are highly vulnerable to global warming, rising sea levels and 
maritime degradation. Not only may this threaten the inhabitants’ quality of life and in the 
longer run even the very existence of some of the islands, but there are also increasing risks 
for the tourism industry which is crucial to many of the territories’ economies (Baver & 
Lynch, 2006; Gargominy & Boquet, 2013; Ferdinand, 2018). Especially the non-sovereign 
territories in the tropics are vulnerable to ecological degradation and global warming in the 
decades to come (Kelman, 2014). This will negatively impact their economic resources and 
in turn enhance their dependence on metropolitan support.  
 Across the board, but with appreciable differences among them, non-sovereign 
territories enjoy higher standards of living than do independent states of similar size and 
endowments in the same areas (Table 1; McElroy & Parry, 2012; World Bank, 2017). Their 
constitutional status is the major explanatory factor here. At the same time, standards of living 
tend to be clearly below the metropolitan average. While the latter observation may result in 
political mobilization for more metropolitan support, the former is a strong and apparently 
decisive argument for great majorities in the non-sovereign territories against the pursuit of 
independence (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2017). This is not to say that the populations of the 
non-sovereign territories value their status only because of economic advantages, but certainly 
this factor is crucial. 
Largely as a result of its size, Puerto Rico is the only American non-sovereign territory 
with a strongly diversified economy, but in recent years the island experienced a deep 
economic crisis, compounded by the devastating Hurricane Maria in 2017. The other 
American territories largely rely on services, tourism, fishing, and US military activity. All of 
the American jurisdictions rely heavily on US federal funds (US Office of Insular Affairs, 
2017). Standards of living differ considerably, but overall the contrast with the mainland US 
states is glaring, and unemployment figures are high. Particularly in the case of Puerto Rico, 
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this has led to massive migration throughout the post-War decades, and today the Puerto 
Rican communities in the US outnumber the insular population.  
The French overseas territories’ economies are mainly based on tourism and the 
agricultural production of export commodities such as banana, sugar and rum in Martinique, 
Guadeloupe and La Reunion. Some territories have developed specific economic sectors, like 
nickel mining in New Caledonia and the European space center in French Guiana. Overall, 
while standards of living in the French territories are much higher than in surrounding 
sovereign insular states, their economies perform worse than in mainland France, with far 
higher levels of unemployment and poverty (INSEE, 2017; Brasset & Le Pablic, 2014, p. 1; 
Schneider, 2017).  
All Dutch non-sovereign territories are located in the Caribbean, and much of what 
has been said of the French non-sovereign territories applies here as well. All Dutch islands 
have per capita incomes far exceeding Caribbean and Latin American averages. While the 
economies of the largest two, Aruba and Curaçao, were long dependent on their refineries 
processing oil from nearby Venezuela, today the major industry on all islands is tourism, 
backed up by other tertiary sector activities, including financial services (Alberts, 2016). In 
common with virtually all Caribbean states, the Dutch Caribbean faces serious challenges with 
respect to drug trafficking and money laundering undermining the official economy. 
Metropolitan financial transfers are structural and indispensable for maintaining the present 
standards of living, particularly on the smallest islands. Incidental transfers included a €1.7 
billion debt cancellation in 2010 and a €0.5 billion pledge to help rebuild the three Northern 
Caribbean islands after the disastrous 2017 Hurricane Irma. Dutch transfers to the three 
smallest Caribbean islands amount to the highest per capita transfers (Prinsen, 2018, p. 151).  
While the British territories are scattered across the globe, they share a small size, and 
their economies are mainly services driven, with tourism and in some Caribbean islands also 
a significant offshore finance sector. The Falkland Islands in contrast sustain a considerable 
fisheries industry. The 1999 and 2012 Foreign and Commonwealth White Papers expressed 
the British government’s responsibility for the advancement of the British Overseas 
Territories (Clegg, 2013). Again, average standards of living are mostly below the 
metropolitan per capita income, while there are also wide discrepancies within the category 
of British Overseas Territories. British financial transfers are limited.  
The Nordic non-sovereign territories have diverse economic bases. Per capita incomes 
in these territories are high (Karlsson, 2009). The fishing industry is extremely important in 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, yet both Danish territories receive ample economic support 
from Copenhagen. The Finnish territory of Åland has a very prosperous economy, mainly as 
a result of a successful shipping industry and the presence of several high-tech companies that 
provide employment to the population. 
The three Australian jurisdictions rely on small but quite successful tourism sectors, 
sustaining a relatively high GDP per capita income. By contrast, the geographically isolated 
territories of New Zealand have a comparatively low level of economic development. All 
these territories receive ample development funds from metropolitan states. 
The conclusion we may draw from this section is more ambiguous than from the 
previous ones. There is little doubt that their constitutional status privileges non-sovereign 
territories over sovereign island states, partly because of direct metropolitan support. On the 
other hand, in virtually all non-sovereign jurisdictions per capita incomes are lower and 
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unemployment is higher than in their metropolitan state. This apparently does not inspire 
pro-independence struggles, arguably because the metropolitan state is seen as indispensable 
for confronting economic and increasingly also ecological challenges. But as we will see, an 
awareness of this discrepancy does inspire ambitions for more equality.  
 
Constitutional and political arrangements 
While non-sovereignty characterizes the entire group of territories reviewed here, there are 
significant differences in constitutional arrangements, varying from full political integration to 
semi-federal arrangements or a more or less unaltered colonial status. The level of meaningful 
autonomy therefore varies considerably between territories (Baldacchino, 2010; Rezvani, 
2014). Yet in all cases, matters pertaining to foreign affairs and defense are handled by the 
metropolitan state, and in most arrangements there is considerable room for metropolitan 
intervention in financial and legal matters – if not preventive, than at least as soon as the 
metropolitan state concludes that there are serious problems in a particular territory. In all of 
these aspects therefore, the limits of whatever autonomy has been achieved are clearly and 
sometimes painfully delineated.  
Two of the American territories (Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico) are 
Commonwealths with considerable domestic autonomy, while the other three are 
Unincorporated Territories. Puerto Rico falls under the direct authority of the Presidential 
Office and is treated administratively as if it were an American state. Puerto Rico, American 
Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands have internal self-government under a local 
constitution, while American Samoa and the US Virgin Islands remain under the organic act 
approved by the US Congress, which determines their legislation. People born in US overseas 
territories are US citizens, apart from American Samoans, who are considered US nationals, 
meaning they have limited political rights. While the residents of the territories enjoy most 
of the rights of mainland American citizens, they cannot vote in US presidential elections and 
have no representatives in Congress, apart from a non-voting member in the House of 
Representatives. 
The French overseas territories follow two different constitutional arrangements. On 
the one hand, the Departments and Overseas Regions of the Outre-mer (DROM) (comprised 
of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guiana, La Réunion, and Mayotte) follow the principle of 
‘legislative identity’. Any laws or regulations that are passed in France are readily applicable 
there, with the possibility of adaptation on specific issues at the request of local or national 
representatives (Faberon & Ziller, 2007). On the other hand, the Collectivities of Outre-mer 
(COM) follow the principle of a special legislative regime. These territories have been granted 
the possibility of a larger legislative and political autonomy based on their own interests. 
However, the French State still oversees all matters related to nationality, public liberty, 
foreign policy, currency, defense, police and maritime security, and even university teaching. 
Since 1998, New Caledonia has a unique status that offers the possibility of a gradual transition 
to independence. A referendum on the subject in November 2018 disclosed however that 
59% of voters oppose a constitutional separation from France. As they are incorporated into 
the Republic, the French territories are also part of the European Union. 
The decolonization of the Dutch Caribbean was halfway completed with the 1954 
Statuut or Charter granting autonomy in domestic affairs to Suriname and the six-island entity 
of the Netherlands Antilles within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In 1975, Suriname 
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obtained full independence, and in 1986 Aruba seceded from the Netherlands Antilles, 
becoming a Kingdom country on its own. In 2010, the Netherlands Antilles were dissolved. 
Since then, the Kingdom of the Netherlands includes four constituent countries, Aruba, 
Curaçao St. Maarten, and the Netherlands itself. The three least-populated islands have been 
incorporated into the Netherlands as ‘public entities’, basically overseas municipalities 
(Veenendaal, 2015). The four countries have autonomy in domestic affairs, while the 
Kingdom government is responsible for foreign affairs, defense and the guaranteeing of 
democracy and good governance. As the Dutch dominate the Kingdom government and 
moreover dispose of far greater means, a striking imbalance characterizes this arrangement, in 
spite of solemn claims of equality and reciprocity (Oostindie & Klinkers, 2003; Oostindie, 
2013). Moreover, over the past decades, the Dutch government has clearly worked towards 
getting a firmer grip on Dutch Caribbean governance, pointing at recurring integrity and 
financial issues while at the same time shying away from investing in sectors such as education 
or welfare in the autonomous Caribbean territories. In contrast to the French DOMs, the 
Caribbean islands of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are not an integral part of the European 
Union, as they have the status of an EU ‘overseas country or territory’ (OCT). 
The constitutional arrangements made by the British government for the UK overseas 
territories are neither the French type of full integration, nor the Dutch, Nordic or Australian 
and New Zealand models of some sort of local autonomy. There is limited local autonomy, 
and locally elected governments are responsible for insular affairs, but in each territory a British 
governor acting on behalf of the British government has the right to intervene in local politics 
and even to oust a locally elected administration altogether on suspicions of corrupt 
government, as occurred in the Turks and Caicos Islands in 2009. In this respect, the British 
models seem more reminiscent of colonialism than all the other arrangements. Among the 
British territories, only Gibraltar is an integral part of the European Union. 
The Danish Faroe Islands and Greenland are both governed under Home Rule 
arrangements, providing for internal self-government. The autonomy of Greenland was 
enhanced to Self-Rule in 2009, following a referendum, but matters relating to defense and 
foreign affairs remain based on Danish legislation. While Denmark is a member state of the 
European Union, its two territories are not; the Faroes never had any ties to the EU, and 
Greenland exited from the Union in 1985. The Faroe Islands and Greenland both have two 
elected representatives in the Danish Parliament. The Finnish Åland islands also have 
considerable internal autonomy and are an associated member of the Nordic Council. 
The three Australian jurisdictions are ‘External Territories’, and while Christmas Island 
and the Cocos Islands are administered by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional 
Development, Norfolk Island is ruled as part of the Australian state of New South Wales. The 
latter island is the only Australian territory that has experience with self-government, as 
Norfolk was ruled by a directly elected legislative assembly between 1979 and 2015. 
However, in 2010 the local administration voiced its intention to abolish self-government in 
return for financial support from the Australian government to relieve the territory’s 
significant debt. In spite of a 2015 referendum resulting in an overwhelming majority for 
retaining internal self-government, later that year the Australian government passed a law 
abolishing self-government in Norfolk.  
 The overseas territories of New Zealand are among the most autonomous in our 
sample. Cook Islands and Niue are both Associated States, and in practice almost function as 
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sovereign countries with full internal self-government. Even though neither territory is a 
member of the United Nations, their independence in foreign relations is recognized by the 
UN. New Zealand acts on behalf of its Associated States in matters relating to defense and 
foreign affairs, but only on the basis of mutual consent and consultation. Tokelau, by contrast, 
is ruled as a Territory, and referendums on Free Association in 2006 and 2007 narrowly failed 
to reach the two-thirds supermajority required for a status change. 
 In conclusion, there is a great variety of constitutional arrangements, varying from full 
integration into the metropolitan state as in the French case to various forms of local 
autonomy in all other cases. There have been skirmishes over the delineation and meaning of 
autonomy in several cases, particularly where a metropolitan state such as the Netherlands has 
been actively reclaiming previously delegated administrative powers – inevitably leading to 
accusations of ‘recolonization’. Even so, as we will discuss more extensively in following 
sections, the major struggle seems to be about something else: social justice and real equality. 
 
The appreciation of non-sovereignty 
 
Before we discuss local appreciations of non-sovereignty, it is useful to point to the broader 
international dimension. As stated above, freely chosen non-sovereignty is an internationally 
accepted outcome of any decolonization process. The UN’s present list of non-self-governing 
territories comprises ten British Overseas Territories (including the disputed Falklands); three 
American territories (the US Virgin Islands, American Samoa and Guam); French Polynesia, 
French New Caledonia; Tokelau (New Zealand); as well as the disputed territory of the 
Western Sahara which we will not include in our analysis. According to Chapter XI of the 
United Nations’ Charter , the UK, the US, France and New Zealand are required to promote 
the well-being of these “territories whose people have not yet reached a full measure of self-
government” and to provide regular reports about these places.  
Most non-sovereign territories however are not represented in this list, including Puerto 
Rico, the other French territories, the Dutch Caribbean and the Australian and Danish 
dependencies. Their respective metropolitan powers are not obliged to report to the United 
Nations about the conditions of, and their policies for, their dependent territories. The 
rationale is that the latter category has achieved a satisfactory level of self-government, but 
obviously the UN list as it is also reflects diplomatic skirmishes which have not ended. There 
have thus been several attempts by the UN’s Special Committee on Decolonization to take 
the US to task about Puerto Rico, and dissatisfied representatives of non-listed non-sovereign 
territories have unsuccessfully attempted to bring their case for the UN’s Special Committee 
on Decolonization. But whether non-sovereign territories are on the United Nations’ list or 
not, the bottom line is that for better or for worse, they can only negotiate with their metropolis 
about the terms and effects of their relationship, not through international institutions. 
All metropolitan states involved are either firmly positive about continuing postcolonial 
relations with former colonies, or have accepted that they cannot unilaterally end these 
relations against the will of overseas populations that are firmly opposed to a definitive break 
up. Mainly for geopolitical reasons, the United States and France have demonstrated an 
unequivocal willingness to continue these arrangements. British policies have been somewhat 
mixed in this respect. While the United Kingdom was happy to retreat from the Caribbean 
altogether and has only grudgingly accepted its continued presence in this region, it has 
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demonstrated more enthusiasm elsewhere for geopolitical reasons – including of course open 
warfare in the case of the Falklands/Malvinas (1982). The Dutch are only present in the 
Caribbean as the islands, in contrast to Suriname, have continued to refuse the ‘gift’ of 
sovereignty – responsibilities and obligations rather than positive interests define the Dutch 
presence. By and large the same might be observed for the policies of the remaining 
metropolitan states, though perhaps some with some differences for Denmark and New 
Zealand. In general one might argue that all metropolitan states may perceive some strategic 
benefit in the continuing postcolonial arrangements, if only because they enlarge their global 
geopolitical status. But then again, this strategic benefit comes at a financial price, and may be 
defined as a collateral of a constitutional bond that they would not strive for today if there 
would not have been this particular colonial history. 
 Unlike in colonial times, however, any possible changes in constitutional relationships 
are not only contingent upon metropolitan preference, but equally upon the political 
ambitions and public opinions of the former colonies (Prinsen & Blaise, 2017). And the latter 
are not directed towards full independence, but rather towards either maintaining the status 
quo or enhancing autonomy (Prinsen, 2018, 146). Either way, in many of these territories 
there is a call for ‘true equality’, including metropolitan respect for local cultures. Frustration 
about a lack of true equality has resulted in widespread political activism, and will likely 
continue to do so. 
 
American territories 
The US acquired its various overseas territories for geopolitical reasons, and continues to value 
these possessions because of this, even if Puerto Rico – by far the largest and most populous 
of these islands – may increasingly be perceived as a liability rather than an asset. Even in 
Puerto Rico, with its painful Spanish and American colonial history, the independence 
movement has never become a prominent political force. In the most recent referendum 
relating to the island’s political status in 2012, only 5.5% of voters chose independence, while 
61.2% favoured the island officially obtaining full US statehood. The case of Puerto Rico 
reveals US indolence in addressing the concerns and requests of insular areas, and after the 
referendum the US government did not take any steps to satisfy Puerto Rican requests for US 
statehood. The island’s deep economic recession fostered debate about its future political status, 
with the ‘Puerto Rican side’ affirming that the island is administered in colonial fashion by an 
exploitative metropole (Gonzalez, 2017), while the ‘US side’ holds a corrupt and inefficient 
Puerto Rican government responsible for the huge debt (Neate, 2015). Plagued by a crippled 
economy and devastation from Hurricane Maria in the summer of 2017, relations between 
Puerto Rico and the United States have only become more tense, fuelled by a strong sense 
that “America has let Puerto Rico down” (Economist, 2018). It is unclear whether recent 
developments will change preferences among the population, 300,000 of whom have migrated 
to the continental United States since Hurricane Maria. Puerto Rican politicians have 
strengthened their calls for full equality and representation in the metropolis, which 
theoretically might be realized by the attainment of full US statehood. 
The four smaller American overseas territories have no serious pro-independence 
movements. The small size of the islands, the absence of local political parties outside of the 
US Democratic/Republican party system, and the crucial economic support of the US has 
blocked the emergence of any pro-independence political projects. Efforts in these territories 
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– such as in Guam in the 1970s (Kiste, 2006) and recently American Samoa – to clarify and 
ameliorate their current ambiguous positions have been in vain, if only because of the obvious 
lack of American commitment to significant change.  
 
French territories 
The French Outre-mer presented and presents considerable military, scientific and economic 
advantages for France’s position in the world. Located in three oceans, the Outre-mer enables 
France to have military facilities all around the world (Ferdinand, 2018). France became a 
nuclear power by testing its nuclear weapons in formerly colonized Algeria and French 
Polynesia, which still bear the environmental and health costs of this “radiance” (Hecht, 
2014). Moreover, since 1965, the Guianese space center in Kourou has been the center of 
operation for all space launches of France and the European Space Agency (ESA), operated 
in part by Ariane Espace. Finally, France currently has the second-largest Exclusive Economic 
zone in the world (11 million m2), 97% of which is located in the Outre-mer. This not only 
indicates the rich biodiversity of the Outre-mer (it holds 80% of France’s national biodiversity) 
but also points to economic opportunities in terms of fishery resources and seabed exploration 
(Gargominy & Boquet, 2013; MOM, 2016). 
Since the mid-1970s, there had been no referendum on possible independence in the 
French Outre-mer (Idriss, 2018). The 2018 referendum in New Caledonia turned out to 
confirm that full sovereignty is not in the cards, not even in this French territory with the 
strongest pro-independence movement in the entire Outre-mer. In the last 40 years, 11 other 
referenda solely involved questions on autonomy and local administration within France. 
Overall poll results confirm a consistent wish in the Outre-mer to remain part of France 
(Zenou, 2009; IFOP, 2015). 
 At the same time, the Outre-mer has a long history of criticizing the French state and 
of social protest, as highlighted over the past decade in the French Caribbean, Mayotte and 
New Caledonia (Le Monde, 2017; William et al., 2012). Acknowledging that the social 
equality promised by the 1946 departmentalization law is still not achieved, in 2017 France 
enacted a law aiming for “real equality” for the Outre-mer, bridging the social and 
infrastructure gap between the overseas territories and mainland France.  
French overseas territories have also nurtured criticism of the French republicanism that 
equated the political association of the French State to cultural assimilation. Initial claims for 
independence turned to pleas for more autonomy within France while asserting a strong 
cultural identity (Gordien, 2018; Dumont, 2010). A crucial element is the struggle for 
recognition of the history of slavery as integral to the narrative of the French nation, resulting 
in a law recognizing slavery as a crime against humanity, which in 2001 was defended by 
former Guyanese deputy and former minister of Justice Christiane Taubira (Chivallon, 2012). 
Referring to the continuing social divides between mainland France and the Outre-mer, 
to discriminatory practices by the French state, and to the marginalization of their cultural 
identities, many of its inhabitants still feel they are considered “second class citizens” of France 
(L’Etat Outre-mer, 2016; Lemercier et al., 2014; Larcher, 2014). Hence the claim for a “more 
perfect” equality with the mainland, as well as the demand for recognition of distinct cultural 
identities (Bonilla, 2015).  
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The Dutch Caribbean 
Since the 1970s, there has been a considerable number of plebiscites, elections with the 
political status as a major issue, and countless surveys on issues relating to the relations between 
the Dutch Caribbean islands and the Netherlands, as well as the relations between the islands 
themselves, all of which, including the most recent ones, have confirmed the choice of non-
sovereignty. The results of two linked surveys (1998, 2015) point to a familiar theme in 
postcolonial non-sovereign societies: the painful trade-off between head and heart 
(Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2017). Dutch Caribbean citizens express a strong preference for a 
continuation of the present non-sovereign constitutional relations, even if they are well aware 
that the (European) Netherlands ultimately decides their fate – at least, as long as they do not 
opt for full independence. When asked why, island inhabitants consistently offer a range of 
pragmatic arguments: financial support; security issues such as territorial integrity and the 
safeguarding of democracy and human rights; the Dutch passport and hence the right of abode 
in the Netherlands; and, remarkably, Dutch administrative supervision of locally elected 
administrations (Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2017). 
At the same time, the survey outcomes demonstrate a considerable rise between 1998 
and 2015 of feelings of resentment about the nature and impact of the increasingly strong 
Dutch presence, ranging from economic concerns to issues of culture and identity 
(Veenendaal & Oostindie, 2017). This indicates that while, from a pragmatic, rational 
perspective, non-sovereignty may be thought of as an acceptable or even desirable political 
arrangement, this outcome may be strongly and increasingly resented from a more political, 
ideological and also psychological point of view. 
Another survey conducted in the three Dutch Caribbean municipalities in 2015 as part 
of the evaluation process of the new constitutional arrangements suggested a similar 
ambivalence (Spies et al., 2015). This is all the more remarkable as after the constitutional 
reform of 2010, the Dutch government made considerable investments in these islands, 
amounting to €10,000 per capita annually, easily ten times as much as in the autonomous 
Dutch Caribbean countries. This points to a paradox with worrying consequences for Dutch 
policymakers: financial support might be needed, but money alone is not enough and might 
even stir up local frustration. The various surveys disclosed widespread feelings of 
disenfranchisement and relative deprivation, summed up in angry accusations of 
‘recolonization’, ‘modern slavery’ and ‘apartheid’. 
Over the past decade the Dutch government also intervened directly in the governance 
of its three presumably partner countries in the Caribbean, either because of financial (Aruba) 
or democratic (Curaçao) issues, or both (St. Maarten). These Dutch policies reflect a change 
in approach since the early 1990s: if independence is no longer an option, then the Caribbean 
governments will be made to conform to Dutch standards of good governance (Oostindie & 
Klinkers, 2003). The increased Dutch presence, both in governance matters and through the 
rise of mass tourism, has not translated into a pro-independence movement, but does elicit 
recurring complaints about ‘recolonization’ and has translated into the rise of anti-Dutch 
populism in politics. 
 
British Overseas Territories 
The British Overseas Territories (BOTs) vary considerably in the extent to which they are 
economically and financially dependent on London, and attitudes towards non-sovereignty 
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and enduring constitutional relations with the United Kingdom appear to be contingent upon 
both levels of economic development and demographic characteristics (Clegg, 2013). In 
BOTs that can be considered settler territories and that are still mainly populated by white 
Europeans such as Pitcairn, the Falkland Islands and to some extent St. Helena, Ascension 
and Tristan da Cunha, support for ties with the United Kingdom remains unequivocally high. 
Identity-related issues hardly play a role here, because the population continues to feel 
staunchly British, even if there might occasionally be tensions as a result of unwanted 
metropolitan interference in local affairs. 
 The size and characteristics of the local populations also play a role in local appraisals 
of the non-sovereign status. In the least-populated BOTs, there has never been much 
opposition to the UK. In the more populous territories, and especially those with significant 
non-Western populations and/or historical legacies of oppression and slavery, resistance 
towards the UK has been greater. British interference in allegedly weak or even corrupt local 
governance, such as in Bermuda and the Turks and Caicos Islands, may have provoked 
tension, but even here only minorities strive for independence (Clegg, 2012b). In all, while 
it is unlikely that any of the BOTs will proceed towards independence in the coming years, 
certainly in the larger territories resentment may be expected to continue, arguing for more 
support and/or less interference from the United Kingdom. 
 
Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland 
The economies of the Faroe Islands and Greenland obtain clear advantages from their non-
sovereign status. Standards of living are similar to Denmark, the economies have been growing 
in the past 15 years (apart from some years after the economic crisis of 2008), and the 
population is growing or stable. Unlike in most other non-sovereign territories, significant 
claims for independence do exist in both Danish territories. The first referendum in the Faroe 
Islands about independence, held in 1946, resulted in a narrow majority for independence. 
The Danish government at the time did not accept the result and the outcome was overturned 
in a subsequent consultation in 1948. Since 1991, Faroese home rule has been strengthened 
(Ackren & Lindstrom, 2012). A status referendum was planned for May 2001, but was cancelled 
after the Danish government threatened to discontinue economic support. However, the 
results of a 2018 referendum on a draft constitution for the Islands have enhanced 
opportunities for self-determination and may even pave the way for future independence of 
the Faroe Islands. 
Greenland acquired the Faroese model of home rule in 1979, and enforced its 
autonomous power in the decision of leaving the EEC in 1985. In the 1990s, a wave of 
autonomist sentiment swept the island, and in 2009 home rule was extended to self-rule. But 
as in the case of the Faroe Islands, the Greenlandic economy presently cannot survive without 
extensive Danish support, frustrating the pursuit of full independence. The exploitation of 
natural resources could be a way to improve revenues and sustain self-rule, and given that there 
is a general political consensus in Greenland in favor of eventual independence, debate about 
constitutional status currently focuses more on economic self-sufficiency (Grydehøj, 2016a). 
To complicate matters, stepping up the exploitation of natural resources might have serious 
environmental consequences, on top of the grave social problems already plaguing Greenland 
(Hersher, 2016; Kleist, 2010; McSmith, 2008). 
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The rather open approach of the Danish government towards the territories’ requests 
for autonomy leaves the door open for full independence. Yet not only economic, but also 
administrative relations block this choice. As Grydehøj (2016b) remarks, Denmark created an 
institutional framework based on metropolitan institutions in Greenland which is too complex 
for Greenland’s size and society and only reinforces dependence on Denmark. The same 
might be said for the Faroe Islands. Thus while local autonomy is higher than ever before, 
postcolonial relations are still characterized by Danish hegemony and, inevitably, local 
ambivalence and resentment. 
 
Australian and New Zealand territories 
Unsurprisingly in view of their diminutive size, the three Australian non-sovereign territories 
do not have significant independence movements. However, given their lack of internal 
autonomy and the dominating way in which the Australian federal government has governed 
these islands, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the contemporary status among island 
inhabitants, particularly on Norfolk where internal self-government was revoked by Australia 
in 2015, a measure widely seen as “recolonization” (Gonschor, 2017). In vain so far, local 
opposition has called on the UN to restore the local autonomy and democracy of Norfolk, 
and endeavors are underway to have the island inscribed on the UN’s list of non-self-
governing territories (http://www.norfolkschoice.com/).  
Located just to the south of Java, Christmas Island has seen the arrival of numerous 
refugees and migrants via Indonesia, and in 2002 the Australian government established an 
Immigration Reception and Processing Centre on the island, notorious for its dismal 
conditions (Firth, 2016). The local population has not been vocal about these matters or more 
broadly about its constitutional ties with Australia. Meanwhile, the main political issue in the 
neighboring Cocos Islands has been the divide between the European (Christian) and Malay 
(Muslim) population segments. These issues, rather than constitutional status, dominate local 
politics in this Australian dependency. 
The New Zealand territories enjoy the most autonomous status of all non-sovereign 
polities surveyed in this paper. The relationship between Cook Islands, Niue, and New 
Zealand is regarded as a free association, from which each partner may withdraw at any time 
(Aldrich & Connell, 1998, p. 55). The extensive internal sovereignty and the voluntary nature 
of the association with New Zealand assuages potential calls for independence in these 
territories, which might really be enjoying “the best of both worlds” (Baldacchino, 2006, p. 
49). The situation is slightly more complicated for Tokelau, where New Zealand retains 
considerable decision-making power. The option of free association received the support of 
almost 65% of voters in a 2007 self-determination referendum, just below the required two-
thirds supermajority (Hooper, 2008). 
 
Discussion 
 
The present paper has aimed to provide a broad overview of non-sovereign territories around 
the world, and has sought to provide insights into these jurisdictions’ motivations to retain 
relationships with former colonial powers. In virtually all territories, it seems unlikely that 
there will be any substantial constitutional changes in the sense of a transition to full 
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sovereignty anytime soon – and this includes the most likely candidates for this step, the 
Danish dependencies of Greenland and the Faroe Islands and French New Caledonia. 
Overall, the various metropolitan states are either not interested, or not in a position to 
enforce a change of status quo, the UN remains largely aloof, and mainly for pragmatic 
reasons, the non-sovereign jurisdictions themselves are not interested in independence. This 
means that the relevant debate for the decades to come lies elsewhere, namely in the pursuit 
of the non-sovereign jurisdictions of both more equality in a material sense and at the same 
time a perception of sufficient space for some degree of both political and cultural autonomy. 
Why only small minorities and few political parties in this wide array of non-sovereign 
territories claim to opt for full sovereignty is easily explained by reference to the factors 
discussed above. An awareness of the vulnerability that comes with smallness, the result of 
geography and demography combined, makes it very unlikely that most of these territories will 
never be viable as independent states, at least in the present world order. Vast majorities of their 
populations realize this, and prefer the benefits of non-sovereignty instead: economic support, 
protection of territorial integrity, democracy and human rights, and the passport of and right 
of abode in the metropolis. Among the factors that we have discussed, the difference in colonial 
legacies (and in particular the distinction between former settler colonies and former exploitation 
colonies) has the greatest effect on attitudes towards non-sovereignty. Yet even in the territories 
with the most brutal and traumatic colonial experiences (i.e. those in the Caribbean), clear 
majorities of the population continue to prefer non-sovereignty to full independence.  
In contrast to the wealth of data available on opinions about the postcolonial 
arrangements among the electorates of the non-sovereign territories, there is no systematic 
quantitative research available on attitudes among the metropolitan populations. Perhaps we 
might conclude that this metropolitan mood ranges all the way from a longing to end these 
postcolonial bonds through indifference and lukewarm support to genuine enthusiasm. 
Metropolitan politicians, in turn, whatever their personal preferences, simply need to accept 
the fact that these postcolonial bonds are here to stay, whether they like it or not. In contrast, 
most people in the non-sovereign territories strongly feel that precisely because of colonial 
history, they have the right to remain as long as they want within whatever postcolonial 
arrangement that has been defined. Moreover, they express their rights within this 
constellation as the right of ‘true equality’, as it has been defined in the case of the French 
Outre-mer. The debate therefore is no longer about transitions towards full sovereignty, but 
rather about striking a reasonable balance between metropolitan interests and means and the 
desires of the non-sovereign territories. This debate about ‘true equality’ is a difficult one, 
bearing in mind the divergent means, interests and perspectives of the parties involved. 
What are the factors that will determine this process and its outcomes? All else being 
equal – including the grim prospects of climate change (see however Kelman, 2019) – the 
dependence of the non-sovereign territories on their metropolitan states will most likely 
increase. This begs the question of whether the latter will rise to the challenge of pursuing 
‘true equality’. Here of course it does help that in all cases, metropolitan states can easily afford 
serious support for these small-scale territories. But this is not to say that they will always act 
accordingly: the recent American negligence of hurricane-struck Puerto Rico is a painful 
reminder that the metropolis sometimes shirks what many would regard as its responsibility 
towards former colonies. It is unlikely that the paradigm of ‘true equality’, which harks back 
to ideas about postcolonial solidarity and perhaps even reparation, will be upheld in all cases. 
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The non-sovereign territories will continue to expect support from their former 
colonial states for overcoming the limited economic and administrative viability inherent to 
their small scale and geographical isolation. This might involve striving for closer institutional 
links, which in most cases will mean moving towards the French model of full integration. 
This, in turn, would require a willingness on both sides to revise extant constitutional 
arrangements, plus a metropolitan preparedness to raise financial support. The latter condition 
in particular seems to be at odds with the rising tide of chauvinist populism in many 
metropolitan states. Moreover, the recent Dutch Caribbean experience underpins the notion 
that this sort of change may evoke deep resentment about assumed ‘recolonization’.  
Two decades ago, Aldrich and Connell (1998, p. 24) rightly suggested that “status issues 
in the territories are never fully resolved.” To various degrees, there is a longing for change 
in the non-sovereign territories, defined either as more metropolitan support, more political 
and cultural autonomy, or both. In this regard, judging from past experience, the outcome of 
both more support and more political autonomy seems rather unlikely to us: if metropolitan 
states are willing to raise financial support at all, this is invariably done by demanding more 
political control over purportedly inefficient, incompetent or even corrupt local 
administrations in return. Given this awkward choice, citizens and politicians in the non-
sovereign territories alike have opted time and again for the pragmatic choice of retaining 
indispensable aid at the cost of political autonomy. 
It is a matter of debate whether this trade-off will be upheld and how it will continue 
to be sought for in the non-sovereign territories. In a recent article, Gerard Prinsen (2018) 
offers a very optimistic analysis of developments across the global category of former European 
colonies that are now non-sovereign jurisdictions. His argument, which in a sense confirms 
Rezvani’s (2014) equally positive argument quoted in the introduction of this article, is that 
these jurisdictions have been remarkably successful in getting the best out of their 
constitutional arrangements. Prinsen substantiates this argument by referring to their assumed 
success in altering the specificities of these arrangements to better serve their needs, to bend 
the rules of association to their own optimal advantage, to ensure a constant and growing 
flow of metropolitan transfers, and to build up an international diplomatic presence that 
clearly goes beyond the original constitutional parameters. While the evidence presented by 
Prinsen is solid and actually coincides to a large degree with our findings, we do question 
whether this is the entire story, and particularly whether the ‘success’ Prinsen ascribes to the 
agile politicians in the non-sovereign territories is really that representative both for what is 
actually happening and for what politicians and the electorate actually make of the 
circumstances. Bearing in mind the bitter complaints and genuine fear of ‘recolonization’ 
and/or being left behind in many of these territories, we argue that the conclusion that these 
postcolonial relationships are being “redefined on – mostly – islanders’ terms” (Prinsen, 2018, 
p. 158) is stretching the argument too far.  
Certainly non-sovereign territories will continue striving to get the best out of their 
postcolonial arrangements. Pragmatic benefit and hence ‘true equality’ represent one 
dimension of that struggle, while greater cultural autonomy and respect for local cultures 
grounded in a delicate colonial history represent the other. This indeed is what we observe 
from Greenland to Martinique – but not at all in places such as the Falkland Islands/Malvinas 
or St. Pierre and Miquelon, with their metropolitan majorities. We may even suggest that the 
demand of respect for local cultures has become the Plan B for communities that have suffered 
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from colonialism and its legacies but that at the same time, for pragmatic reasons, have decided 
against full independence. It seems likely that in the coming decades, alongside ecological and 
economic challenges, these ideological and cultural issues will continue to dominate the 
agenda. And the debate will also be played out in the metropolitan states, as by now substantial 
numbers of the populations of the non-sovereign territories have settled there. Whatever the 
outcome of these debates, it seems clear that in these former colonial territories, the once 
evident polarity between sovereignty and non-sovereignty is becoming decreasingly relevant, 
as the real issue is the struggle for social justice and true equality, both materially and culturally. 
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